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na1tiOlllal politics no 
ther than its decision last term in 
City of Boerne v. Flores. 
In striking down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, the Court 
reasserted its role as the ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution. 
Under the Supreme Court's 
landmark 1803 decision in Mar-
bury v. Madison, wrote Justice An-
thony M. Kennedy in his opinion 
for the Court in City of Boerne, "The 
power to interpret the Constitution 
in a case or controversy remains in 
the Judiciary." 
It was hardly unusual that the 
Court invoked Marbury in City of 
Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
Throughout its history, the Court 
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meaning. 
This position, that constitution-
al truth derives solely from a major-
ity vote of the Supreme Court's nine 
justices, has figured prominently, 
for instance, in the ongoing nation-
al debate over abortion. 
In its 1992 decision reaffirm-
ing the "central holding" of Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, the Court claimed author-
ity to resolve the abortion dispute, 
invoking "the Nation's commitment 
to the rule of law." 
The Court declared that its "in-
, terpretation of the Constitution 
calls the contending sides of a 
national controversy to end their 
national division by accepting a 
common mandate rooted in the 
Constitution." 
The problem is, no one pays 
much attention to these pronounce-
ments by the Court until issues 
arise that have overriding impact 
on widespread political or social con-
cerns. And then just about everyone 
has an opinion about what the 
Constitution means. 
As Justice Antonin Scalia has 
complained, the justices are subject 
to "carts full of mail from the pub-
lic, and streets full of demonstra-
tors, urging us-their unelected 
and life-tenured judges-to follow 
the popular,will." 
Justice Scalia, of course, thinks 
the Court ought to resist such pres-
sures. But the corresponding belief 
that Supreme Court decisions are 
the last word in constitutional dis-
putes is parochial, shortsighted and 
just plain factually inaccurate. 
The Court may be the ultimate 
interpreter in a particular case, but 
not always in the larger issue of 
which that case is a part. 
Congress, the White House, 
various government agencies, inter-
est groups, the general public and 
the states all play critical roles in 
shaping constitutional values. 
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cali-
brates to limit political 
reprisals. Moreover; when the Court 
declares itself the final word on 
the meaning of the Constitution, 
chances are that it feels especially 
challenged by the other branches. 
As Ruth Bader Ginsburg ob-
served before her appointment to 
the Court in 1993, judges "play an 
interdependent part in our democ-
racy. They do not alone shape legal 
doctrine .... [T]hey participate in a di-
alogue with other organs of govern-
ment, and with the people as well." 
In the Beginning 
Marbury v. ·Madison, the sup-
posed foundation of judicial su-
premacy, nicely illustrates how 
politics and constitutional decision-
making are inextricably linked to 
each other. 
When Marbury was decided, 
the Supreme Court and its chief 
justice, John Marshall, were under 
attack. Court foe Thomas Jefferson 
had just been elected president, 
and at his urging, Secretary of 
State James Madison openly chal-
lenged the judiciary's power to 
subject the executive branch to 
court orders. 
Specifically, when Wil-
liam Marbury challenged 
Madison's failure to deliv-
. . . challenge, therefore, 
was to craft an opinion that would 
support judicial power over the 
elected branches while avoiding a 
head-to-head confrontation he-
tween the judiciary and the execu-
tive. The solution was to firs.t ac-
knowledge the merits of Marbury's 
challenge but then conclude that 
the Court was without jurisdiction 
to resolve the dispute. 
Along the way, the Court was 
also able to establish judicial re-
view, holding unconstitutional the 
statute. that granted it jurisdiction 
in the Marbury dispute. 
Marshall's tactics in Marbury 
reveal that Supreme Court decision-
making cannot be divorced from its 
political context. 
Indeed, well into the · 19th 
century constitutional decision-
making 
was 
dominated by the elected branches. 
Without a body of Supreme Court 
decisions to look to, Congress and 
the president had no choice but to 
engage in definitive constitution-
al interpretations. And when the 
courts did speak, elected officials 
were not inclined to treat those deci-
sions as final. 
A dramatic example of how the 
elected branches controlled constitu-
tional decision-making occurred in 
1832, when President Andrew Jack-
son vetoed legislation rechartering 
the Bank of the United States. 
The fact that the Supreme 
Court had approved the bank's 
chartering in McCulloch v. Mary-
land was irrelevant to the presi-
dent: "The opinion of the judges," 
Jackson proclaimed, "has no more 
authority over Congress than the 
opinion of the Congress has over 
the judges, and on that point the 
President is independent of both. 
Each public official who takes an 
oath to support the Constitution 
swears that he will support it as he 
understands it, and not as it is un-
derstood by others." 
Another insight into three-
branch interpretation comes from 
the bitter struggle over slavery. 
Through Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
the Court intended to "definitive[ly]" 
settle the issue of slavery. By hold-
ing that the right to own a slave was 
"distinctly and expressly affirmed 
in the Constitution," however, the 
Court deepened the schism that ul-
timately led to the Civil War. 
Dred Scott's status as the last 
word on slavery was immediately 
called into question, most notably 
by Abraham Lincoln. For Lincoln, 
Court decisions were necessarily 
binding on the parties them-
selves but could not bind 
elected government to judi-
cially imposed policy-mak-
ing. 
Otherwise, Lincoln said, 
the "people will have ceased 
to be their own rulers" if gov-
ernment policies are "to be 
irrevocably fixed by the de-
cisions oL the Supreme 
Court." 
The Court again found 
itself under sharp attack ear-
lier in this century for striking 
down about 200 social and eco-
nomic laws, narrowly construing 
the authority of both Congress and 
the states to regulate commerce 
and broadly construing the due 
process rights of employers. 
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In the mid-1930s, after a num-
ber of New Deal laws fell victim to 
the Supreme Court's rulings, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt con-
cocted his plan to "pack" the Court 
with additional justices, presumably 
ones sympathetic to his New Deal 
reforms. 
The Court-packing plan proved 
to be a political debacle for Roose-
velt, but the Court soon began an-
nouncing decisions upholding New 
Deal programs. 
Justice Owen J. Roberts, a 
member of the Court throughout 
the 1930s, later said, "Looking back, 
it is difficult to see how the Court 
could have resisted the popular urge 
for uniform standards throughout 
the country for what in effect was 
a unified economy." 
While the Supreme Court often 
has issued decisions in reaction to 
political or social trends, Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), illustrates what impact the 
Court can have when it moves out 
in front of public opinion. 
Today, it seems inconceivable 
that the basic declaration of racial 
equality in Brown tested the limits 
of judicial authority. When Brown 
was decided, however, segregation 
was so ingrained in the South that 
outlawing "separate but equal" 
school systems promised social tur-
moil and massive resistance. To 
minimize opposition in the South, 
the justices spoke in a single mod-
erate voice. 
Significantly, after the Court's 
monumental decision in Brown, 
Congress and the executive have 
framed most of the debate on ra-
cial issues, starting primarily with 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
The saga of abortion rights 
likewise underscores the interactive 
nature of constitutional decision-
making. 
As in Brown, the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 
served as a critical political trigger. 
When Roe v. Wade was decid-
Abraham Lincoln, Justice 
John Marsha.ll and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt all had their 
c'lashes over whether 
decisions of the Supreme 
Court permanently bind 
elected government 
officials. 
ed in 1973, a vigorous right-to-life 
movement had successfully blocked 
pro-choice legislation in a number 
of states. Consequently, though 
polls at the time indicated 64 per-
cent of Americans supported the 
liberalization of abortion laws, Roe 
nonetheless invalidated the laws of 
46 states. 
Roe also prompted elected gov-
ernment into action. From 1973 to 
1989, 306 anti-abortion measures 
were passed by 48 states. 
Congress and the White House 
also took aim at Roe. Through fund-
ing and other restrictions, the fed-
eral government revealed its oppo-
sition to expansive abortion rights. 
In cases before the Supreme Court, 
the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions called for Roe's reversal. 
After two decades of resistance 
to Roe v. Wade by elected officials 
and a significant portion of the 
public (and a changing lineup of 
justices), the Court eventually re-
turned much of the jurisdiction ov-
er this divisive issue to the states. 
By repudiating the stringent tri-
mester test from Roe v. Wade in 
favor of a more deferential undue 
burden standard, the Court in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey sig-
nalled its willingness to uphold 
state regulati~n-if not prohibition 
-of abortion. 
Government vs. the Courts 
Abortion and school desegrega-
tion, like slavery before them, make 
a mockery of claims that Supreme 
Court decisions are authoritative 
and final. A permanent feature of 
our constitutional landscape is the 
ongoing tug and pull between elect-
ed government and the courts. In-
deed, when the Court invokes judi-
cial supremacy, chances are that 
elected officials are breathing down 
the justices' necks. 
Take City of Boerne v. Flores, 
the Court's most recent invocation 
of judicial finality. 
The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, which Boerne invalidat-
ed, was a direct challenge to Court 
efforts to limit First Amendment 
protections against government con-
duct that targeted religion. When 
President Bill Clinton signed the 
act, he spoke unabashedly of "this 
act revers[ing] the Supreme Court" 
and of his conviction that elected 
government's view of religious lib-
erty "is far more consistent with 
the intent of the Founders than [is] 
STOCK MONT AGE 
the Supreme Court." Congression-
al sponsors of the measure con-
demned the Court's "degradation," 
"devastation" and ''virtual elimina-
tion" of religious freedom. 
To Supreme Court justices, 
these are fighting words, and, as 
such, it is not surprising that the 
Court decided to fight fire with fire. 
In its decision in City of Boerne, the 
Court, after proclaiming horror at 
the prospect that "[s]hifting legisla-
tive majorities could change the 
Constitution," suggests that the role 
of elected officials in effecting con-
ernment's most direct link to judi-
cial decision-making is the overtly 
political process of selecting and ap-
proving federal judges. 
These decisions, moreover, sup-
port the claim that, in critical re-
spects, the Court's constitutional de-
cisions "follow the election returns." 
The Court ruling in Printz v. 
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 
(1997), for instance, which struck 
down portions of the Brady Act re-
quiring local officials to conduct 
background checks on prospective 
handgun purchasers, cannot be dis-
most notably Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
that the Supreme Court does little 
more than "prolong divisiveness" 
when it "ventures too far in the 
change it orders." 
Under this view, "in a democra-
tic society," some basic choices about 
the identification and elaboration 
of constitutional values ought to be 
made by the people, acting through 
elected lawmakers. 
Of course, by passing judgment 
on the legitimacy of state laws 
outlawing suicide, Glucksburg and 
Quill may well affect the content 
States' rights entered into Printz, striking down 
portions of the Brady Act on handgun registration. 
stitutional change is limited to "the 
difficult and detailed amendment 
process." 
These statements, remarkably, 
come from a justice, Anthony Ken-
nedy, who had told members of 
Congress that they "would be ful-
filling [their] duty'' by limiting the 
effects of Supreme Court decisions 
that they think are "wrong under 
the Constitution." 
In fact, several of this past 
term's decisions underscore the ex-
traordinary role that social and 
political forces play in shaping con-
stitutional values. 
On highly charged decisions 
that divided the Court, for exam-
ple, the term was dominated by a 
five-member coalition of justices ei-
ther appointed or elevated by pres-
idents Reagan and Bush (Rehn-
quist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy 
and Thomas). 
The decisions dominated by this 
group make clear that elected gov-
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In Planned Parenthood, the Court returned much 
of the jurisdiction over abortion to the states. 
entangled from the fundamental 
shift toward states' rights that has 
resulted from the 1994 Republican 
takeover of Congress and its pur-
ported blueprint for legislative ac-
tion, "The Contract With America." 
More striking, in the related 
1997 cases of Washington u. Glucks-
burg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, and Vacca u. 
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, a unanimous 
Supreme Court refused to declare 
physician-assisted suicide a new 
constitutional right and held that 
"the earnest and profound debate" 
taking place throughout the nation 
on assisted suicide should not be 
short-circuited. 
At the same time, the Court re-
fused to close the door to the possi-
bility that future state legislation 
in this area could be upheld. 
Glucksburg and Quill reflect 
both calls for judicial restraint that 
date back to the Reagan adminis-
tration and an increasing recogni-
tion on the part of progressives, 
of this populist constitutional dis-
course. It is a debate that will be 
dominated by nonjudicial actors. 
Similarly, Reno v. ACLU, 117 
S. Ct. 2329 (1997), invalidating the 
Communications Decency Act on 
"void for vagueness grounds," re-
turned that issue to elected officials. 
"There is a magnetic attraction 
to the notion of an ultimate consti-
tutional interpreter," wrote political 
scientist Walter Murphy in 1981, 
''just as there is a magnetic pull to 
the idea of some passkey to consti-
tutional interpretation that will, if 
properly turned, always open the 
door to truth, justice and the Amer-
ican way." 
But just as finality is not the 
language of politics, constitutional 
decision-making, too, is a never-
ending process. Whether the issue 
is abortion, race or the rights of re-
ligious minorities, judges and law-
makers are likely to shape the Con-
stitution together. • 
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